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Lawrence Kohlberg’s (1969) theory of moral 
development has been used to study moral rea-
soning in adults as well as children (e.g., Gil-
ligan, 1977; Holstein, 1976; Kuhn, Langer, 
Kohlberg, & Haan, 1977). The theory posits six 
culturally universal stages of moral judgment 
over the life-span: The lower three usually 
emerge by adolescence, whereas the upper three 
develop, if at all, during middle to late adoles-
cence or adulthood (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). 
Like Piaget’s stages of cognitive development, 
Kohlberg’s stages of moral development have 
their own internal coherence, and they are ar-
ranged in ascending order of complexity; 
each stage represents a differentiation of the ba-
sic elements in the preceding stage and their re-
integration into a new, more logically powerful 
structure (see Kohlberg, 1969).
Kohlberg’s claim that his scheme is cultur-
ally universal is based on three premises. First, 
the structure of moral judgment is transformed 
through the six stages from simpler to more ad-
vanced forms in a logically necessary order. Sec-
ond, the moral dilemmas used in eliciting judg-
ments center on universal issues such as life, 
property, authority, and affectional roles. Finally, 
all cultural groups possess systems of values that 
have certain basic formal and functional proper-
ties in common (Kohlberg, 1971, p.175). For ex-
ample, all cultures distinguish between impulse 
and desire on the one hand and behavior that is 
justified and “right” on the other. 
Nevertheless, because the stages were orig-
inally derived from interviews of male Amer-
icans, they have been criticized as ethnocentric 
and biased (Bloom, 1977; Gibbs, 1977, 1979; 
Gilligan, 1977; Simpson, 1974; Wilson, 1976). 
These critiques suggest that the upper end of 
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This study explores relationships among moral reasoning (as measured by the Kohlberg scale of 
moral development), social roles, and cultural context among the elders in a small, traditional Kip-
sigis community of western Kenya. Six traditional leaders—men who were considered morally out-
standing by their neighbors and who were frequently called on to help settle local disputes—were 
interviewed, using an adapted version of the Kohlberg moral dilemmas; six men who were simi-
lar to the leaders in age, education, religion, and wealth but who were not considered moral leaders 
were also interviewed. The leaders scored slightly but significantly higher than the nonleaders on 
Kohlberg’s scale. All of the men’s responses, however, were in the Stages 2–4 range, with no rep-
resentation of the two highest stages. The cultural values expressed by the men’s responses are dis-
cussed in relation to their own roles in the community and in relation to the structure of traditional 
Kipsigis society, and Kohlberg’s theory is critically reexamined.
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Kohlberg’s scale is arbitrary and vulnerable to 
attack in a way that is different from the lower 
end of the stage sequence. Findings from a num-
ber of studies conducted in non-Western set-
tings suggest that moral judgment Stages 5 and 
6, and Stage 4 as a person’s dominant stage, are 
not seen in traditional adults from small, face-
to-face communities such as exist in peasant 
or tribal societies (cf. Kenyan studies by Ed-
wards, 1975, 1978; Turkish studies by Turiel, 
Edwards, & Kohlberg, 1978; Bahamian stud-
ies by White, 1975; White, Bushnell, & Regne-
mer, 1978; British Honduran studies by Gorsuch 
& Barnes, 1973; Nigerian studies by Magsud, 
1977a, 1977b,1979; Indian studies by Parikh, 
1980). Edwards (1975, 1980) argued that the up-
per stages are not likely to be found in all cul-
tures because they correspond to modes of con-
flict resolution in complex societies. According 
to Edwards, the reasoning of the lower stages 
appears compatible with a much greater variety 
of social organizations, and one might expect at 
least some individuals in all cultures to reason in 
ways corresponding to these stages. 
Another problematical aspect of Kohlberg’s 
theory is its relationship to other measures of 
people’s moral functioning, such as moral stand-
ing with peers and actual moral behavior. Al-
though researchers with a behavioral perspective 
might disagree (e.g., Kurtines & Greif, 1974; 
Burton, Note 1),Kohlberg (1969, 1973) hypoth-
esized that people with “conventional” (Stages 3 
and 4) moral reasoning adhere to cultural norms 
of “good conduct” more consistently than do 
people with “preconventional” (Stages 1 and 2) 
moral reasoning. Experimental studies of be-
havior in moral conflict situations (Krebs, 1967; 
Krebs & Rosenwald, 1977; McNamee, 1977) as 
well as studies of peer reputation (Harris, Mus-
sen, & Rutherford, 1976; Keasey, 1971) have 
demonstrated some relationships between these 
behavioral or social variables and moral reason-
ing. We know of no published evidence, how-
ever, that can speak to the issue of how moral 
reasoning may be related to moral reputation or 
behavior in non-Western cultures. 
The research described here addresses the 
relationship between moral reasoning and so-
cial roles. Specifically, we ask whether people 
who occupy roles as civic leaders and arbiters 
of justice in their own community use styles of 
moral reasoning that differ from others who are 
not “moral leaders.” More broadly, we consider 
the relationship between individual moral de-
velopment and sociocultural context. 
The setting for the present study was a ru-
ral Kipsigis community of western Kenya. The 
Kipsigis are a Highland Nilotic people num-
bering about half a million. Traditionally pasto-
ralists and simple agriculturalists, the Kipsigis 
today have adapted to the modern national econ-
omy through cash production of milk, maize, 
pyrethrum, and tea. A relative abundance of land 
has allowed most Kipsigis men to remain farm-
ers at home rather than seek salaried jobs away, 
and family herds still suffice for the traditional 
paying of brideprice. Other features of the tra-
ditional life-style also persist: Adults in Kok-
wet, as we refer to the community studied, have 
had little or no schooling, and adolescents al-
most unanimously choose to undergo the tradi-
tional circumcision or clitoridectomy rites that 
mark the transition to adulthood. Despite half a 
century of missionary activity in the area, most 
families have made no more than a nominal con-
version to Christianity, and polygyny is still the 
preferred household style for most men. 
Kipsigis society is particularly well suited 
to a consideration of relationships between so-
cial roles and Kohlberg’s scale of moral reason-
ing. Unlike modern Western society, with its 
specialization of roles and responsibilities, tra-
ditional Kipsigis society provided for the set-
tlement of disputes at the neighborhood level 
through meetings of its members. With the im-
position of the British judicial system during 
the colonial period and its subsequent continua-
tion under the Kenya national government, au-
thority for handling the more serious crimes has 
been removed to the police and courts. Never-
theless, this still has left a large range of lesser 
disputes among family members and neighbors 
to be settled at the community level. 
The process of dispute settlement in Kokwet 
fits the general pattern that has been described 
for sub-Saharan groups lacking superordinate 
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systems of authority (Bohannon, 1957; Gluck-
man, 1959; Gulliver, 1963; Saltman, 1977). In 
these communities, the only force behind the 
settlement of disputes is public opinion; conse-
quently, a prime characteristic of the dispute set-
tlement process is the participation of the com-
munity. The main goal of dispute settlements in 
communities such as Kokwet is not to uphold an 
abstract principle of justice but rather to bring 
the disputants into social equilibrium with each 
other and thereby reestablish peace in the com-
munity. For this reason, the principle of fairness 
is mitigated by other factors such as the rela-
tive status of the disputants and a sense of real-
ism about what kind of reparations the two par-
ties will be willing to offer or receive. Although 
this set of factors and final decision might differ 
somewhat from Western models, there seems to 
be no reason to assume that the process of moral 
reasoning involved in Kipsigis dispute settle-
ments differs from the process that the Kohl-
berg interviews are meant to elicit. Indeed, the 
cases that came up during our 3 years’ residence 
in Kokwet were similar to the Kohlberg moral 
dilemmas in having a complex set of rights and 
wrongs on each side. In one case, two grown 
sons beat their father out of anger that the father 
refused to share his land with them. The princi-
ple of paternal authority was badly violated, but 
the father had failed in his responsibility to pro-
vide land for his sons. Who was right and who 
was, in Kipsigis terms, “mistaken”? 
The process of dispute settlement in Kok-
wet is one in which all members of the commu-
nity participate at times, whether as disputants, 
mediators, or quiet members of the group. The 
roles of active leadership in these meetings, 
however, are held by the boisiek (s. boiyot), or 
“senior men,” of the community. As this term 
implies, boisiek are well-established heads of 
household, thus usually (though not always) 
somewhat older. There are, however, wide vari-
ations in the extent to which individuals in this 
category are called on to help settle disputes. A 
boiyot whose opinion is most sought and whose 
leadership is most valued is one who “speaks 
the truth” at dispute settlement meetings; he 
sees to the heart of a problem and presents his 
insights with skill and tact. He is a master of 
diplomacy, speaking in such a way as to elicit 
an apology rather than defensiveness from the 
wrong-doer. Moreover, his own behavior out-
side of the meetings does not betray his words. 
He does not deceive people about his own in-
tentions, and he does not use any personal 
power derived from community leadership po-
sitions to enhance his own wealth. Rather, he 
works for the good of the community. 
The social role of leadership in dispute set-
tlements appears to require verbal and rhetori-
cal skills, powers of intellectual reasoning, and 
recognized moral integrity. Does the differenti-
ation of this role in a traditional African com-
munity correspond at all to the kinds of vari-
ation formalized in the moral judgment scale? 
Specifically, do men in Kokwet who play pre-
eminent roles in community dispute settle-
ments score higher on the moral judgment in-
terview than other men from the community 
who participate to a lesser degree in the settle-
ment of disputes? The answers to these ques-
tions should be informative in relation both to 
claims of cultural universality of the Kohlberg 
scale and to the question of its relationship to 




All of the men who participated in the study were res-
idents of Kokwet, a community of 54 households that was 
the locus of ethnographic and psychological research by 
Harkness and Super from 1972 to 1975. Although the sam-
ple was limited by the size of the community, it had at least 
two assets not usually present in psychological research. 
First, the universe represented by this sample was highly 
consistent. Second, a great deal of formal and informal in-
formation on each of the subjects was available. 
The sample consisted of 12 men: 6 moral leaders and 
6 nonleaders matched as closely as possible for age, edu-
cation, religion, and wealth. The men chosen for the moral 
leader group were people who, in the judgment of the eth-
nographers and a local assistant, were the most highly re-
spected men of the community. These men were frequently 
asked to help settle disputes, and they often held offi-
cial positions of authority as well (e.g., deputy to the local 
subchief, treasurer of the community self-help society, or 
member of the school committee). 
Subsequently, all of the subjects were asked who, in 
their opinions, were the “most respected and honest men 
of Kokwet.” Members of the leader group were named an 
average of 5.1 times (range 1-9) by the 10 men who re-
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sponded to this question. Members of the nonleader group 
were mentioned an average of only .5 times (range 0-2). 
These responses reflect the fact that moral leadership in 
Kokwet was a relative, not absolute, status, held to vary-
ing degrees by different men. Our group designations cor-
responded well to the subjects’ opinions, with one interest-
ing exception: the nonleader who was named twice as one 
of the most respected men of Kokwet. This man enjoyed an 
equivocal status in the community: Because of his wide ex-
perience in the world outside Kokwet and his political acu-
men, he often held positions of official responsibility. He 
was not generally respected for his moral qualities, how-
ever, and was never, to our knowledge, asked to help settle 
disputes outside his own family. 
The leaders and nonleaders were matched for back-
ground variables to minimize the effects of these factors on 
the results of the study. Both age and socioeconomic status 
have been related to performance on the moral judgment 
scale in American, Turkish, and Kenyan adults (e.g., Ed-
wards, 1978; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Turiel, Edwards, 
& Kohlberg, 1978). Religion—specifically the degree of af-
filiation with Western-introduced Christianity—has proved 
to be a strong predictor of attitudes and behavior in other 
domains among the people of Kokwet. 
The measures of age and education, recorded in years, 
are based on self-reports. Wealth is measured inversely as 
the size of the household’s outstanding debt to the Kenya 
Government for purchase of land in the settlement scheme, 
according to official records. Religion is based on self-re-
ports, expressed on a 4-point scale constructed to reflect lo-
cally acknowledged variation in degree of conversion to 
Christian values and life-style. 
It was not possible to match each pair of leaders and 
nonleaders perfectly on all four of the background vari-
ables, but statistical comparison showed the two groups 
to be equivalent in mean values, t(10) = .33, –.74, 1.14, 
and .32 for age, education, religion, and wealth, respec-
tively; p is nonsignificant. The leaders were on the average 
slightly older, poorer, less educated, and more Christian-
ized than was the nonleader group but not significantly so. 
There was, however, wide variation within both groups on 
three of the four variables. The age of the subjects ranged 
from 28 years to 74 years. Half the men had never attended 
school, whereas the remainder had from 4 to 8 years of 
primary education. Half the men had no Christian affilia-
tion; of the others, three were nominal Christians, and three 
were more committed Christians. Variation in wealth was 
not great because all of the men had received equal plots of 
land and equal numbers of livestock when they moved to 
Kokwet only 10 years before.  
Interview
The moral judgment interview included three hypothet-
ical moral dilemmas accompanied by a set of questions for 
discussion. The dilemmas were standard Kohlberg stories 
adapted for the Kenya setting. The first story presented the 
problem: Should a boy obey his father and give him some 
money he had earned himself when the father had prom-
ised the boy he could keep it? The second story posed the 
dilemma: Who did worse—a boy who stole money from a 
store or his brother who conned a trusting old man out of an 
equal amount? The third story asked: Is a man right or wrong 
to steal a drug to save his dying wife when he could not ob-
tain the drug legally? 
The men were interviewed at their homes by the first 
author, with the help of a local woman who acted as inter-
preter. The task was introduced by explaining to each man 
that he was going to be told three problem cases such as he 
might hear in a community dispute settlement meeting. He, 
as a boiyot, would be asked to judge what was right and 
what was wrong. All of the men readily accepted this task 
and became quite involved in giving their judgments. 
Scoring
The interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed 
directly into English by a bilingual Kipsigis male college 
student. The translations were checked and corrected by the 
first author. Using the Global Method (Kohlberg, 1958), the 
second author scored the dilemmas without knowledge of 
the subjects’ identities. The interviews were later scored 
twice, independently, by experts in the newer Standard 
Scoring Method (Colby, 1978; Kohlberg et al., in press). 
The second author worked with the other raters to clar-
ify specific cultural meanings for critical phrases that re-
cur in the interviews. For example, when Kipsigis speakers 
answer a question concerning what a father should do for 
his son by saying simply that “he must educate him,” they 
need to be understood as referring to the strongly held Kip-
sigis value that a father must pay his children’s school fees, 
not as necessarily making a more general statement that a 
father should “guide” and teach his son in many aspects of 
life. These two interpretations have different implications 
for stage scoring. 
Reliability of the two standard scorings was .77, and 
all of the subjects were scored within a half stage by the 
two scorers. The two sets of standard scores and the global 
scores yielded the same conclusions upon statistical anal-
ysis; that is, each showed the same pattern of group dif-
ferences and correlations with independent variables. The 
data presented here are derived from the standard scoring 
for which the most detailed exchange of cultural informa-
tion took place.
Results
The group of moral leaders obtained signif-
icantly higher Moral Maturity Scores than did 
the group of nonleaders, matched pairs t(5) = 
3.68, p = .01, two-tailed. Of the six matched 
pairs of men, only one nonleader scored higher 
than did the corresponding leader; this was the 
man who had received two nominations as a 
“most respected” man of Kokwet. The entire 
group of 12 Moral Maturity Scores varied from 
a low of 257 to a high of 321; Stages 2 and 3 
clearly predominated in the responses, with 
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some usage of Stage 4 found for only four men, 
three of them leaders. 
The index of community moral reputation—
the number of times mentioned as one of the 
“most respected men of Kokwet”—correlated 
strongly and significantly with the Moral Ma-
turity Scores, r(11) = .72, p =.01, two-tailed. 
The social background variables (age, educa-
tion, wealth, religion), however, were not found 
to relate significantly to Moral Maturity Scores, 
r(11) = .15, –.02,.15, and .47, respectively. 
Thus, although these four factors may contrib-
ute to status in the Kokwet community, they 
were not by themselves good predictors of the 
scores of moral reasoning. 
Although the leaders and nonleaders were 
discriminable in terms of the underlying stages 
of their reasoning, it is useful to note that they 
did not differ in terms of the sides they took in 
resolving the dilemmas. In response to the fa-
ther-son story, all six of the nonleaders and 
five of the leaders agreed that the boy should 
give up the money. All 12 men in the sample 
agreed that stealing was worse than fraud, as 
shown by their responses to the two brothers 
story. Finally, in response to the drug dilemma, 
four men in each of the two groups said that it 
was right to steal the drug, and two men in each 
group said that it was wrong.
Discussion
The differences between the leaders and 
nonleaders can be discussed in relation to 
three key areas: authority, reciprocity, and con-
science. The higher scores of the leaders de-
rived from the fact that they approached these 
issues with a view to the good of the whole 
community, not just their own immediate ben-
efit, and that they, more often than the nonlead-
ers, described the control of behavior as gener-
ated from within oneself. 
Authority
The area of authority is illustrated in the 
different ways the leaders and nonleaders dis-
cussed the important masculine role of head of 
the household.  All of the men agreed that chil-
dren should always obey and respect their fa-
ther, but in the eyes of the leaders, a man should 
command natural respect through his own su-
perior moral qualities. His authority should be 
maintained through being reasonable and non-
arbitrary, and he should teach his children to 
obey willingly for the common good of the 
family. In the words of some of the leaders: 
When your children do not refuse to do what you tell 
them, then you can be sure that the order is acceptable to 
them. They like it because it is a fair demand. (Leader A, 
Stage 3 [4]1)
The father is the doer and the leader. He is the one who 
has to do better than everyone else and set the example. ... 
(Leader B, Stage 3 [4]) 
If my son doesn’t follow my words [advice], he maybe 
lost to the world since he and I won’t be understanding 
[that is, cooperating with] each other. . . . You convince him 
by .telling him, “Do this sort of thing because this will earn 
us our living.” . . . And so the child will comply thereafter 
since you did not shout at him. (Leader C, Stage 3) 
According to the nonleaders, however, the 
head of household was simply a strong man, a 
ruler: 
James [in the father-son story] should give the money 
to his father because the father is a big person. (Non-leader 
F, Stage 3 [2]) 
The father has the right to control his children in ev-
erything. You have to direct them in what they do because 
they are your children. . . . They should not overrule you 
but instead they should adhere to what you tell them be-
cause you are the head, the leader for them. (Nonleader C, 
Stage 3 [2])
Reciprocity
Reciprocity as described by the leaders of 
Kokwet is the focal point of Kipsigis moral or-
der. The value of reciprocity is explained by 
the leaders in the context of the family, whose 
members help each other in a spirit of cooper-
ation and gratitude, not of strict accounting of 
benefits given and received: 
A child has to give you what you ask for just in the 
same way as when he asks for anything you give it to him. 
Why then should he be selfish with what he has? A parent 
loves his child and maybe James [in the father-son story] 
refused without knowing the need of helping his father. ... 
1 The scores are the subjects’ global scores for their overall 
interview based on the Standard Scoring Method. The ma-
jor stage is indicated outside the brackets; the minor stage, 
if present, within the brackets. Letter designations for the 
leaders and nonleaders reflect matched pairs (e.g., Leader A 
is matched to Nonleader A).
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By showing respect to one another, friendship between us 
is assured and as a result this will increase the prosperity of 
our family. (Leader D, Stage 3) 
The father is testing James by asking him for the 
money, and if James gives him that money, the father will 
know that they are one, in unity. He will know that he has a 
goodhearted child. (Leader E, Stage 3) 
The leaders also apply this idea of reciproc-
ity to relations among fellow community mem-
bers. Here it takes on aspects of the Golden 
Rule, doing to others what you would have 
them do to you: 
It is not bad for John [in the two brothers story] to bor-
row the money because even though he did not intend to re-
turn it, still I will not lay a curse on him. He will some day 
remember the loan when his brain opens and he becomes 
wise. Now he is still young. (Leader C, Stage 3) 
Reciprocity as described by the lead-
ers draws a distinction between relations 
among people who are socially connected and 
outsiders: 
In the past, people used to raid cattle from Kisii peo-
ple, Luo people, or Masai people. . . . That act was blessed 
and the cows multiplied considerably. . . . But it is a sin-
ful thing if you steal from someone you eat with, someone 
with whom you have shared food. Even if he is your en-
emy, as long as he is of your tribe it is bad to steal from 
him because you have eaten with him. (Leader F, Stage 
3 [2])
Thus the Kokwet leaders’ idea of reciproc-
ity is based on ideals about the functioning of 
the social group. In contrast, the nonleaders 
describe reciprocity as a much more concrete 
exchange. 
It wasn’t good of James to refuse [to give his father 
the money]. He should have given it to him so that his fa-
ther could have been overwhelmed with joy and therefore 
James would receive blessings from his father. (Nonleader 
E, Stage 3) 
If Joseph didn’t love his wife, then it was not necessary 
for him to steal the medicine for her.. . . We sometimes say, 
or hear people say, “Why doesn’t this person die so that we 
may have no more troubles?” Because the person is a nui-
sance. (Nonleader F, Stage 3 [2])
Conscience
The idea of conscience, as described by lead-
ers and nonleaders, varies from an inner voice, 
or self-judgment, to an outwardly oriented con-
cern about wrongdoing and fear of punishment 
or disapproval. Conscience as an inner voice or 
self-judgment was best expressed by one of the 
leaders: 
You remain unhappy because you have something in 
your heart that will draw you to a shadow of being afraid 
of something that you have done to someone else. Because 
you will charge yourself according to your heart that you 
were not right at that time. (Leader B, Stage 3[4])
Another leader put forward an inward-look-
ing view of conscience insofar as he described 
guilt as a self-inflicted punishment, a volun-
tary withdrawal from society. Banishment was 
a traditional Kipsigis response to a chronic 
wrongdoer: 
When a person does evil and people speak of it against 
him, he keeps away from company and goes to lose himself 
in the bush because he no longer wants to be seen by peo-
ple. (Leader C, Stage 3) 
Most men, however, displayed approval- or 
punishment-oriented concepts of conscience: 
When one hears someone talking about him saying, 
“Oh, why did he do that?” then his heart is frightened.... 
A person realizes that something is bad only when others 
have seen him. (Leader E, Stage 3)
When a person is grown-up, he knows about right and 
wrong and so when he realizes that he has done some-thing 
bad, he goes to make an apology to some of the elders . . . 
and so he can be excused. His heart does not feel well so he 
begs for forgiveness. (Nonleader B, Stage 3[2])
Stealing is a sin because after you have stolen you re-
member it in your mind when you are very sick. “Maybe 
God is punishing me because I stole. . . . You are all the 
time in a bad condition—worried, or rather, in discomfort.” 
(Nonleader E, Stage 3)
 The elders and nonelders differed in the rel-
ative emphases that they placed on different as-
pects of authority, reciprocity, and conscience. 
To varying extents, however, all of the men of 
Kokwet described a coherent moral order on 
which their community is built. This order en-
tails logical sequences of moral and social re-
lationships and rests on certain assumptions 
about the nature of society. Adherence to the 
community norms of authority, both by subor-
dinates and those in command, is seen as the 
basis of social order. In a family or community 
where authority is justly exercised and duly 
obeyed, all members carry out their reciprocal 
obligations in a spirit of generosity, or “unity,” 
and understanding. The smooth functioning 
of the group effort, in turn, leads to happiness 
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and economic prosperity. In this form of social 
order the leaders play an authority role at the 
community level similar to the role that heads 
of household play at the family level. This form 
of social control is probably related to the com-
paratively infrequent expression of guilt as an 
inner voice. In a social setting where most peo-
ple live out their lives under the close supervi-
sion of family and community elders, only the 
elders themselves need develop a strong sense 
of inner control. It is worth noting, in this con-
text, that the punishment-oriented responses of 
the leaders quoted above obviously referred to 
feeling states that they attributed to others—
specifically, to inexperienced young men. Their 
own role, implicitly or explicitly, was to be the 
monitors and judges of these younger or less 
wise people. Given this differentiation of so-
cial roles within a single community, the highly 
abstract, internalized sense of guilt common in 
Western society would be superfluous for most 
people (Edwards, 1975; Levy, 1972;  Whiting, 
1959).
The moral order drawn by the men of Kok-
wet depends on two conditions: that the com-
munity be small and that its membership re-
main stable over a period of many years. 
Smallness ensures that all members of the com-
munity know each other and therefore contrib-
ute to the network of mutual obligations and 
controls. Stability over time guarantees that in-
dividual members continue to carry out their 
mutual obligations to each other. These condi-
tions explain why all of the men thought that 
stealing was incomparably worse than fraud. 
Stealing from a member of one’s community 
is a drastic violation of the norm of reciproc-
ity on which the whole community depends for 
survival. The harm done by fraud, on the other 
hand, can always be repaired because the male-
factor is known to the community; even if the 
thief does not intend to repay the debt, social 
pressure will eventually force the repayment. 
Given this pattern of relationships, the tradi-
tional system of dispute settlement that prevails 
in Kokwet works well. The values attached to 
authority demand that a dispute be settled in fa-
vor of the person with higher status, regardless 
of the intrinsic merits of the case. At the same 
time, however, the value of “unity” in recipro-
cal relationships makes it necessary that the so-
lution of any conflict be acceptable to the per-
son of lower status. The apparent contradiction 
between these two needs is probably resolved 
through informal recognition of the lower sta-
tus person’s complaint. The unofficial position 
of the leaders of the community actually re-
sults in their judgment carrying moral weight 
as the best expression of the community’s val-
ues. That is, the leaders of Kokwet are asked to 
preside over dispute settlements because they 
are regarded as wiser and better than the other 
men; if a man so regarded were to act in less 
admirable ways, his status and role in the com-
munity would be adjusted accordingly.
Summary and Conclusions
Critics of Kohlberg have claimed that stages 
of moral judgment have little to do with so-
cial reality. Our research, on the contrary, has 
demonstrated a significant relationship be-
tween a social indicator—a person’s status 
as a moral leader in the community—and re-
sponses to moral dilemmas. The moral reason-
ing of the leaders and nonleaders differed not 
in the sides they took in resolving moral di-
lemmas but rather in the modes of reasoning 
that they used in reaching their conclusions. 
“Conventional”(Stages 3 and 4) reasoning, the 
mode used preferentially by the leaders, seems 
befitting of their role as moral spokesmen for 
the community. As contrasted with “preconven-
tional” (Stages 1 and 2) reasoning, conventional 
reasoning makes a clear distinction between 
what someone might want to do or “would” do 
and what a person ideally “should” do. Obey-
ing society’s standards is perceived as a goal in 
its own right, not simply as a way of obtaining 
desirable practical consequences for oneself. 
This larger perspective would seem to be a ne-
cessity for effective leadership in the settlement 
of disputes among individuals. 
But why are even the leaders of Kokwet 
only at Stages 3 and 4?  Why were Stages 5 and 
6 not apparent in their interviews? We believe 
that conventional modes of reasoning fit well 
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with the assumptions of a small, face-to-face 
society based on close and continued contact 
among people, stable authority of older over 
younger, and networks of cooperation and re-
ciprocal obligation. Stages 5 and 6, on the other 
hand, correspond to the social organization 
and processes of control characteristic of soci-
eties with superordinate justice systems. The 
moral reasoning of Stages 5 and 6 assumes, 
first, a fixed code of law and a formal judicial 
process, and second, a differentiation between 
government and those who govern. Social con-
trol in Kokwet, on the other hand, is exercised 
through community leaders who serve at the 
will of the people in the most immediate sense. 
Dispute settlement is based not on the need of 
each individual for “fair” or equal treatment by 
the law but rather on the need of the commu-
nity for maintaining social equilibrium. Kohl-
berg (1971) argued that his six stages represent 
a scale of increasing adequacy of moral judg-
ment for all individuals regardless of social 
context; we suggest, on the contrary, that the 
upper stages of the moral judgment scale are an 
abstraction of the ways in which Western con-
cepts of law and government have evolved in 
response to the requirements of social hetero-
geneity and a more distant government. When 
viewed across different cultural contexts, dif-
ferences in moral thought and behavior may 
reflect adaptations to the social functions they 
regulate rather than individual developmental 
differences.
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